inar intro — GREGORY HARMS

INTRODUCTION

All through the pages of history one finds people killing one another in the name of God—or so it might seem on the face of it. Perhaps the quintessential example is the Crusades, with their stated attempt to regain the Holy Land for Christendom; there were also the explicitly titled Wars of Religion that took place in sixteenth-century Europe. Some conflicts are less outwardly so. In the modern era, Northern Ireland stands out, as do the bloodletting in the formerly united Sudan and the decades-old tensions in Kashmir. These examples present religious aspects, but when we look more closely, it turns out the core issues in all of them are in fact secular.

News from the Middle East is commonly interpreted through the prism of religion. It seemingly has become a reflex to sum up the different conflicts in the region as being a throwback to biblical times, which serves as a quick and easy way of simplifying what is seen on television. Built into this simplification is also a kind of dismissal: the tacit (and sometimes not so tacit) assertion that the people involved in these conflicts are not of sound mind and therefore the situation—ancient and lunatic—is hopelessly complex and pointless to consider any further. In the West (namely, Europe and the United States) this hopelessness has been encapsulated in one word: Islam.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the topic of Islam has understandably been moved front and center in news coverage and public discourse. This focus, however, has in some cases spun off into strange and disturbing areas. For example, in summer 2010 the so-called Ground Zero mosque controversy surfaced. While the actual proposed project was neither a mosque nor located at Ground Zero, the commentary surrounding it nevertheless encouraged the sense that a Muslim invasion and takeover of Lower Manhattan were close at hand. In addition, during this same period there were reports on a Pew Research poll which indicated that 18 percent of Americans thought that President Barack Obama was a Muslim. The point here is not that these stories are inaccurate—the point is that the Islamic center's "location" and the president's "religion" became sources of indignation. In other words, anything associated with Islam existing at near hallowed ground or in the White House is, to some, unacceptable. More succinctly put, Islam itself is unacceptable.

This fear and hatred, while irrational, is not surprising. The American conception of the Middle East and Islam was impoverished to begin with, and the actions of al-Qaida on 9/11 did not improve matters. Moreover, after almost a decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that have left thousands of U.S. military personnel dead and tens of thousands wounded, physically and mentally, the public's negative view of the Middle East has been compounded. (This is not just an American situation. Western Europe also continues to struggle with its views toward Islam.) The fear and hatred only seem to be directed at Islam. The issue tends to not be theological—that is to say, Islamophobia (fear of Muslims) is generally not based on specific disagreements with the religious tenets of Islam, although some might view Islam as wrong-minded simply because it is not Christianity. In instances of intolerance, the distinctions—common among Middle Easterners that culturally set them apart from us—become the objects of animosity.

There is also the opposing consideration. The Middle East is a place where religion does play a central role in people's lives, just as Christianity does for many Americans. However, the Middle East has borne a burden that the United States has not: it has suffered external intervention in its affairs for the past century, and this burden has had an effect. As is true for any people, when groups suffer hardship, they find solace and strength in what binds them communally. Much of the Middle East is ethnically Arab and religiously Islamic, which of course sets the region apart from the Christian West, which has done the intervening. For most Arabs, being Muslim is a source of identity, a point of cultural pride, and a guiding tradition. Even for those who are less than devout, Islamic culture—the holidays, celebrations, customs—plays a function in social and family life. There is no doubt that religiosity and social conservatism have noticeably risen in the region. Similarly, given the significance of religion there, it makes sense that being Muslim factors in expressions of anger. For those who participate in terrorism, this point of cultural pride is transmuted into a battle cry and an excuse for indiscriminate killing.

While the number of people engaging in terrorism in the Middle East is proportionally scant at best, the sum of Arabs displeased with American policy in their region and home countries is much greater. In the same way, those in the United States who are looking to create Islamophobic hysteria also represent an extremely thin fraction of the population: rightwing commentators, fanatical religious leaders, and producers of farcical Internet videos on "Muslim demographics" that talk of Islam overtaking Europe by sheer force of fertility—the "Eurabia" thesis—all set to ominous music. The so-called Arab Spring uprisings across the Middle East in 2011 have had a positive impact on U.S. opinion, but be that as it may, many Americans are in fact concerned about terrorism, remain unsure about Islam, and wonder what part religion plays in the violence they see on television. These are all understandable concerns, which makes it even more important for us to see what Middle Easterners see—because in most cases, we don't

This short book started as a short essay of the same name. Published online in August 2010 by CounterPunch and Mondoweiss, the piece attempted to address those points on Americans' minds just mentioned—terrorism and religion—while examining the altogether nonreligious grievances of many Middle Easterners, specifically, the U.S. presence in that part of the world. The historical record indicates quite clearly that the latter has played a major part in accentuating the former. Put another way, the anger aroused by European and American exploits in the Middle East has taken on an Islamic tone, but it should be stressed that the origins of the grievances themselves are not religious. In this project I have endeavored to condense the record and explore how and why this accent on religion has taken place, an undertaking inspired by the frequent inquiry, "How much does religion have to do with it?"

The book is divided into five chapters:

The first looks at the manner in which Arabs and Muslims have been presented to Americans over the generations in books and films, exploring what influence this has had on popular perceptions. It is helpful to trace these roots, which go deeper and date back much farther than 9/11.
The second chapter is the first of a two-part history lesson discussing Western Europe's entrance into the Arab world and how the modern Middle East came about. The genesis of the volatility typical of the region is located well into the modern period.
Chapter 3 contains the second part of the historical review and focuses on the sweep of U.S. involvement in the Middle East from just after World War II to the present day. While lack of space prevents a detailed or comprehensive overview, the chapter looks at key events and attempts to identify patterns over the last sixty years.
The fourth chapter studies the rise of militant Islam, terrorism, and the region's increasing fundamentalism and conservatism. There is a good reason many people think religion is the issue, and surveying these developments aids in placing religion-based rhetoric in its proper context.
The fifth and final chapter, in a way, returns to the first and considers the source of some of the ideological assumptions that have been promoted and cemented in the United States; in particular, we will look at the intellectual contributions that sculpt the public's perception of world affairs. In addition to the cultural forces discussed in chapter 1, the parameters for public discourse are also set by scholars, academics, journalists, and mass media.

I hope that this project contributes to the demise of the religion question and furthers its replacement with more relevant ones. Likewise, I hope it acts as a stimulus for wider discussion and better knowledge of the nature of U.S. foreign relations, especially as they pertain to the Middle East. Popular participation in widespread assumptions simply allows those in Washington, D.C., greater latitude for formulating policy as they see fit, and what is visible time and again are the products of those policies: human suffering, economic burden, and the inspiring of revenge. It is crucial for Americans to comprehend that the region's anger, rationally expressed or otherwise, is not because the Arabs do not understand democracy or lack "American" values. It is precisely because they possess these values that they fiercely desire freedom from external domination and seek the ouster of their corrupt, autocratic leaders who work in the service of the West and have done so for the last ninety years.